The risk that autonomous AI agents will independently detect vulnerabilities and exploit them as attack vectors is no longer a futuristic scenario – it has become a tangible and rapidly escalating threat. Unlike traditional tools for automated vulnerability scanning, modern AI agents like AutoGPT or SWE-agent operate with a high degree of autonomy. They can identify target systems, search publicly available vulnerability databases, adapt existing exploits, and construct customized attack chains—entirely without human intervention. These systems can interface with platforms such as Shodan, ExploitDB, or Metasploit, and build scalable, distributed attack strategies in the background.
What makes them particularly dangerous is not only their scalability and learning capacity, but also their high semantic competence: they can analyze configuration flaws in enterprise systems, recognize behavioral patterns in networks, and circumvent security mechanisms by mimicking human behavior. The combination of generative AI and automated exploit generation dramatically lowers the barrier to entry for attackers—even technically less sophisticated actors can launch highly complex attacks with the help of such systems.
Security researchers are already observing early instances of so-called “WormGPT” being deployed for phishing, social engineering, and reconnaissance. In the near future, we can expect self-learning botnets capable of independently selecting attack targets and evolving continuously. Attacks on critical infrastructure conducted by AI-driven systems are no longer abstract threats—they are emerging realities that security leaders must proactively confront.
China plays a central role in this scenario. The People’s Republic is pursuing an ambitious AI strategy, strategically investing in the fusion of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity – both in civilian and military contexts. A key component is the state-sponsored Military-Civil Fusion (MCF), where technologies such as large language models (LLMs), machine learning, and vulnerability analysis are utilized not only in consumer applications but also in military systems. AI tools developed for quality control in smart factories or for process optimization in state-owned enterprises could – with minimal modifications – be repurposed as offensive cyber agents.
China already possesses a broad spectrum of advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, such as APT10 and APT41, which could be elevated to a new level of effectiveness through the use of autonomous AI agents. These groups are known for systematically exploiting vulnerabilities in Western infrastructures – often with the aim of siphoning off technological know-how or preparing acts of strategic sabotage. Autonomous AI agents could act as a multiplier, accelerating attack cycles, optimizing target selection, and scaling offensive strategies behind the scenes – whether on cloud infrastructures of Western companies operating in China or on European subsidiaries of Chinese corporations.
Cyberconflicts involving China are increasingly indirect – waged through proxies, third-party states, or private actors. What is emerging is a digital proxy war that is difficult to attribute definitively. Universities, research institutions, and AI startups may be knowingly or unknowingly integrated into national cyberattack strategies. The line between state-directed operations and informal participation is blurring. In this context, China is both a driver of innovation and a risk factor in the development of autonomous AI agents in cyberspace.
The consequence is clear: purely technical defenses—such as firewalls or static intrusion detection systems – are no longer sufficient. Enterprises and public institutions must develop a new defensive logic that relies on their own AI agents acting in defense. These agents must be capable of detecting potential vulnerabilities early, analyzing simulated attacks, and initiating automated protective measures – before real attacks occur. This is especially critical for European companies that are embedded in Chinese digital platforms or host data in China, as they will need to comprehensively adapt their security strategies.
Sources: APT
China Intellectual Property Blog 